Captain Parlin in the Civil War, Chapter 4
Chapter 4
Grant changes strategy; Second Battle of Petersburg
In the nick of time I come, plunge in the fight,
loudly shout in the rush of successful charge,
Enter the captur’d works . . . Walt Whitman, from The Wound-Dresser
Captain Parlin continues:
We were at the first advance on Petersburg on the 15th of June 1864 -- meeting the rebels a few miles out from City Point where the road crosses a swamp.
What Captain Parlin calls “the first advance on Petersburg,” is now known as the Second Battle of Petersburg. The first assault on the defenses of the city was on June 9th, 1864 and is often referred to as the “Battle of Old Men and Young Boys.” General Butler was eager to atone for allowing the main body of his Army of the James to be bottled up at Bermuda Hundred, an early colonial-era town surrounded almost entirely by the waters of the Appomattox and James Rivers. His predicament was largely caused by his own ineptitude. Because of his humiliation and frustration he admitted, “The capture of Petersburg lay near my heart.” His intelligence sources correctly reported that the city was lightly defended as most of the frontline troops had been sent north to assist General Lee in his running battles with Grant in the Overland Campaign. Thus “Old Men” and “Young Boys” were called up as volunteers. Although Kautz's Union cavalry entered the City and took prisoners on June 9th, infantry under the command of General Gillmore did not press the attack because the general believed an assault on a line of steep earthen works eleven miles long and fortified with 55 artillery batteries, known as the Dimmock Line, would result in heavy casualties. Butler had told Gillmore that a thousand casualties would be acceptable if the city could be taken, but Gillmore was intimidated by the sight of the fortifications and ignored the opportunity to attack in sufficient numbers to seize the advantage. He returned after only 40 casualties were suffered in the attack. (Confederate losses were estimated at 80.) Prior to the attack, Butler had agreed to give Gillmore command of the assault because, as commander of the 10th Corp, he outranked the more aggressive General Hincks who commanded the 3rd Division of the 18th Corps, which consisted mostly of colored regiments. (Butler agreed to place Gillmore in command when Gillmore complained that Butler had named Hincks to lead the assault. Butler later wrote, “I was fool enough to yield to him.”) (wikipedia)
When Gillmore returned from the operation, Butler angrily blamed him for its failure and had him arrested. Grant later intervened and had Gillmore, who later requested a transfer, released.
Unlike the first assault planned by Butler, the second was ordered by Grant. At the end of May, Grant ordered the XVIII Corps under General William F. “Baldy” Smith to quit Bermuda Hundred and re-inforce Meade's Army of the Potomac at Cold Harbor just north of the Chickahominy River, where a major battle was brewing. Hincks's 3rd Division of the 18th Corps included many regiments of USCT including Captain Parlin's, but was not part of force sent north with Smith. Smith's troops fought in the brutal battle at Cold Harbor and, while under heavy fire, twice assaulted well-entrenched rebel lines. Union forces in that battle suffered as many as 14,000 casualties compared to 5,000 under Lee. Despite those casualties and the fact that the battle was fought to a standstill, Grant felt he'd gained a tactical advantage. Smith, however, was disturbed by what he considered Grant's poor strategy and later described one assault on June 3 as “simply an order to slaughter my best troops.” It was an assault that Grant later publicly regretted ordering. At one point, after his troops suffered heavy casualties, Smith refused an order to advance again, claiming it would result “in a wanton waste of life.” Eleven days later, Smith had been ordered back to Bermuda Hundred where he was given command of the next assault on Petersburg, in which the 1st Regiment of the USCT would play a prominent role. His sluggish performance at the Second Battle of Petersburg on June 15th may have resulted from his painful experience on the battlefield at Cold Harbor.
Grant's maneuver to secretly abandon the trenches at Cold Harbor and outflank Lee was brilliant and might have led to an early end to the war if it had been executed properly. In the two-day period when Lee was unaware of the location and intentions of the Grant's forces Petersburg might have been captured and the goverment in Richmond surrounded and under siege. The two commanders had sidestepped each other for over a month from the Rapidan west of Fredricksburg down to the Chickamoniny River east of Richmond and had fought five major engagements and several minor ones with no conclusive result. As the stalemate at Cold Harbor continued and Grant, tired of a lack of success in sparring with Lee, turned to an alternate plan: selected units representing much of his force would steal away in the night from east of Richmond and converge on Petersburg, the railway hub for supplies that sustained Richmond, the capitol of the Confederacy.
In the dead of night Smith led his Corps to Bermuda Hundred on June 14th and met with Butler, who had also met with Grant. Lee and most of his forces were still at Cold Harbor (which was not a harbor, but named for a colonial-era inn that provided unheated rooms) laboring under the illusion that he still faced the vast Army of the Potomac across the battlefield, where hundreds of bloated corpses and critically wounded had lain for four days after the assaults of June 3rd. The two sides did not trust each other enough to retrieve and bury the dead or attend to the dying, whose cries pierced the night.
Captain Parlin's 1st Regiment of the 3rd Division of the 18th Corps did not fight at Cold Harbor. It remained at Wilson's Wharf, renamed Fort Pocahontas, to continue to guard the river. With the bulk of Butler's force was bottled up at Bermuda Hundred by Confederate infantry, Grant believed a flotilla of rebel gunboats sent up the James could surround Butler's army and destroy it.
On June 2nd, in anticipation of the action against Petersburg, Parlin's First Regiment was replaced at Wilson's Wharf/Fort Pocahontas by new recruits from Ohio. (The position was now so well-fortified that it was believed new recruits could defend it.) Parlin's First Regiment, by contrast now battle-tested, was ferried up the James to City Point, opposite Bermuda Hundred. The second longest day of the Captain's life was approaching.
On June 15th, at 2 A.M., elements of the 18th Corp began the six mile march from City Point toward Petersburg's Dimmock Line, the massive earthworks named after the Confederate engineer who designed it. To penetrate this line at any point in it's 11 mile length, a soldier must: cross a half-mile of cleared, mostly flat ground, with no cover, overwhelm soldiers manning rifle pits surrounding the works, make their way through an abatis of logs and sharpened sticks; descend into a moat-like trench six feet deep and fifteen feet wide; and charge up a breastwork of loose earth twenty feet wide at its base and at least six feet high, all the while facing Confederate artillery and small arms fire. Along the full Dimmock line there were over fifty redans, v-shaped or square parapets that protruded out and gave infantry and artillerymen clear fields of fire on the attackers along the line. The rebels were anchored at each end on the banks of the Appomattox above and below the town. Their strength and resilience--as well as the vast human and material resources required to build it--indicate the importance Confederate generals placed on Petersburg, the key to defending Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy.
The assault of June 15th began with a troop of calvary under Brigadier General August Kautz preceding the infantry. It first encountered resistance by a small group of rebel pickets which they quickly chased, and then a more solid entrenchment of sharpshooters backed by two artillery pieces stationed behind temporary rifle-pit fortifications built across the City Point railway and the parallel City Point road. This redoubt was about 800 yards in front of the the main fortifications.
Kautz reported it to Smith, who ordered him to move to the left and proceed southwest while ordering 3rd Division commander Edward Hincks 2nd Brigade led by Colonel Samuel Duncan to assault the rebels. Holman's Provisional Brigade which contained Parlin’s E company, was aligned in support. Three Divisions of the XVIIIth Army Corps participated in the assault on Petersburg. Their attack focused on the first 11 batteries at the eastern end of the Dimmock Line, not far from the confluence of the James and the Appomatox. If they could break through the Dimmock Line, they could easily occupy the city.
Captain Parlin's 3rd Division was commanded by General Edward Hincks. His order of battle:
3rd Division - Brigadier General Edward W. Hincks
Cavalry - Captain Albert F. Ray
Company E, 4th Massachusetts Cavalry
Company H, 4th Massachusetts Cavalry
1st Brigade - Brigadier General Edward A. Wild
5th Massachusetts Colored Cavalry Regiment --- Colonel H. S. Russell
1st U.S. Colored Dismounted Cavalry
1st U.S.C.T. (Captain Parlin's regiment)
10th U.S.C.T.
2nd Brigade - Colonel Samuel A. Duncan
2nd U.S. Colored Dismounted Cavalry Regiment
4th U.S.C.T.
5th U.S.C.T.
6th U.S.C.T.
22nd U.S.C.T. --- Colonel J. B. Kiddoo
Holman’s Provisional Brigade --- Colonel J. H. Holman
1st U.S.C.T. --- Lieutenant Colonel Elias Wright
Detachment, 5th Massachusetts Cavalry (dismounted)
Angel’s Battery
Choate’s Colored Battery
Detachments of the 1st USCT are listed as in both the 1st Brigade and Holman's Provisional Brigade. Captain Parlin could have been in either one. It's not clear to which he was assigned and it may be he only had a vague recollection of it himself at the time of the speech roughly 30 years later. His proximity to the premature charge of the 4th USCT suggests he was in the 1st brigade as does the fatal wounding of Brigham. And yet during the later advance on the main fortifications his description suggests he was with Colonel Holman. Within the 3 brigades of the 3rd Division, the 1st was this day without the services of General Wild, who was feuding with General Hincks at the time and would be arrested by him eight days later for insubordination and crimes he allegedly committed on the expedition through the Great Dismal Swamp. Command of his brigade fell to Colonel H. S. Russell. But Russell, according to Colonel Holman in his report, was wounded in the initial confrontation with skirmishers in the morning: “Colonel Russell was wounded in the charge, and was obliged soon after in consequence to retire.”
In the assault on the redoubt that Kautz had discovered, Duncan's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 22nd USCT, was to march through a wood about 600 yards deep, ford a small stream called Cabin Creek, and then reform in a line before charging the redoubt across 300 yards of open meadow. The assault began at 7 AM. But, once having cleared the wood, the 4th USCT in their excitement began to storm the enemy's redoubt before the line of four regiments was sufficiently formed. The Captain continues:
There Lieut. Alfred [Milo] Brigham [of Natick] was killed. He was mounted acting adjutant & went up the road while we waded the swamp. His horse was torn to pieces by a shell but there was not a scratch on his body. Probably the concussion or the fall killed him. I had him embalmed etc.
I never saw a finer looking officer than he made that morning. I was reprimanded here for not halting my company at the command. But when the battery opened on us that killed Lieut. Brigham my men started for it like mad men and would not be stopped until they had long out-distanced the rest of the regiment.
Second Lieutenant Brigham was part of the 4th Regiment. Contradicting Captain Parlin, Colonel Duncan reported that it was not the 1st USCT but the 4th USCT that jumped the gun and, although restrained by their Lt. Colonel Rogers in their attempt to storm the redoubt, the action drew attention and consequent heavy fire from Confederate artillery to the left, which added a significant number of casualties to the 120 reported for the brief engagement. Duncan also says that the second line, which could have been Colonel Holman's support line, in the chaos of the moment fired upon the troops of the 4th Regiment as it retreated back into the woods. He wrote:
. . . The inexperience of the troops, the terrible fire to which they were subjected, and the nature of ground caused no little confusion among them, which was much increased by the second line in the excitement of the moment opening fire upon the first line.
This friendly-fire incident is described in more detail in Edward Longacres's A Regiment of Slaves, a history of the 4th Regiment USCT. Longacre claims that it was the dismounted 5th Massachussets Colored Calvary under Colonel H. S. Russell's command that charged before a line could be formed. General Hincks reported that the 5th were ill-trained as infantrymen. Other sources described them as disgruntled for being put into service without their horses.
At some point the second battalion regrouped and made its charge. Colonel Joseph B. Kiddoo, commanding the 22nd USCT under Colonel Duncan described it this way:
The charge was gallantly made, and that portion of the rifle-pits in front of my line possessed, together with one 12-pounder howitzer, from the fire of which my men suffered severely while coming from the woods.
Considering Captain Parlin's ordeal for the next 12 hours, it was not surprising if his memory of this initial engagement was flawed. He may have been temporarily commanding a company in the 4th Regiment at the time, but that is not certain. His admission of being reprimanded suggests he was involved.
Duncan also reported the loss of Lieutenant Brigham in this encounter, describing him as "mortally wounded.” Captain Parlin elaborates further in his Youth Speech on the care he took having Lieutenant Brigham embalmed. The two men were Natick natives. Captain Parlin, in his days as a sergeant in the Massachusets 39th, served under Alfred Brigham's brother, Captain Ephraim Brigham. In the Youth Group speech he reveals the personal reasons he had for ensuring that Brigham's body was returned to Natick:
I went back to City Point hospital – and found Lieut Alfred Brigham's body. . . Not a scratch was found on him after death. It must have been the concussion that killed him. His horse was torn to pieces by a shell. I had his body embalmed and it was afterward brought to Natick.
My brother Herman had been killed only a few weeks before at Spottsylvania and I did not want Lieut Brigham's body left as my own brother's had been left so far from home and kindred.
We have never been able to find the last resting place of my brother ---- as the War Department think it is among the unknown dead at the Fredricksburg National Cemetery. Captain Parlin's brother Herman Fletcher Parlin, mentioned earlier in this narrative when then Sergeant Parlin was leaving home and Natick with his regiment, was killed on May 8 at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse, which was the second major battle in Grant's Overland Campaign after the Battle of the Wilderness. The battle at Spotsylvania lasted 13 days and produced 18,000 Union casualties and 14,000 on the Confederate side. Herman was part of a regiment of Massachusetts sharpshooters. He was killed early in the battle. His body was never recovered and was believed to be among the 12,000 unidentified bodies buried at the Fredricksburg National Cemetery Captain Duncan's account of the assault on the rebel redoubt a few miles in front of the Dimmock Line on the morning of June 15th: Through the rise upon the right wing the Fifth and Twenty-second Regiments [of the U.S.C.T.] swept gallantly up the intervening declivity and into the rebelworks. The enemy fled precipitately, abandoning one 12- pounder, which fell into the hands of the Twenty-second, and was immediately turned upon the retreating foe.
The cause [of his 1st Regiment troops not being among the
wounded] was, that our men were on the left wing at the time the
charge was made, and happily escaped the rebel grape and canister.
The prosecution of my journey soon led me to where the first conflict
had taken place. The rebels had a line of rifle-pits and embrasures
thrown up across the road which led to Petersburg and intended to stop
our headway if we attempted to pass by; but the colored troops told the
rebels that it was too early in the morning for such fun as that.
Consequently, they charged upon the rebel works, took all their cannon (four pieces) and flayed the scoundrels as they would a set of mad dogs.
Those of them who escaped the death-pills of our boys played a most
successful game of skedaddling, many of whom won their life by it. My
regiment then led the advance, and drove the rebels some five or six
miles, keeping up a continual skirmish all the time.
The Chaplain's entertaining report is exaggerated. His claim that the rebels were driven "some five or six miles," and had yielded up four cannon was clearly wrong, but his exuberance is worth noting and typical of those who supported the black troops. Colonel John Henry Holman, whose brigade was in support, briefly described the initial action and said of the subsequent advance:
After the rout of the enemy at this point the First
United States [CT] was ordered in the advance, with
directions to clear the way for the advance of the
column, and upon arriving at the bridge, about one mile,where the enemy had been previously intrenched, and deploy to the right of the road. From this point the enemy’s pickets were engaged and quickly driven in, and the high ground, which was desired for the position of our batteries, secured. This was about 9 a. m. Seven companies of the First United States were subsequently deployed upon this line.
Captain Parlin continues: We were then thrown out as skirmishers and were kept there all day long driving the enemy two or three miles to their outer works. In their front was a large wheat field with wheat standing to our waists. It was a poor protection against the bullets & shells and many a poor fellow suffered severely. Several of our officers were badly wounded. One 2nd Lieut. while lying on his face had a solid shot pass under him through the ground. It did not draw blood but shook him up severely and gave him an excuse for getting his discharge. This second lieutenant is one of the few characters in the Captain's accounts who elicits his disdain. In further elaborating on this story in his Youth Speech, he adds adds this to the paragraph above: A while ago I met him in Washington and heard him addressed as Major although his army service ended in this wheat field as 2nd Lieut.
in the Captain's eyes, the Lieutenant was clearly claiming a rank he had not earned.
He continues:
Rebel artillery played on us all day. At one time they sent solid shot to rake the field each one coming nearer and nearer until they passed on the other side of us.
They came bounding along like bat-balls and it seemed as though you might put out your foot and stop them. But when the canister and shrapnel came through the air, you thought the heavens filled with shrieking furies. What terrible noises they made while we were in the woods in the morning. Shells shrieking & bursting all about, trees & branches flying & crashing in every direction. An awful din of all horrible sounds.
I was the special mark of the sharpshooters that day for I held without supports the left of the skirmish line.
Indeed, I had to draw their fire in the morning by exposing myself on a rail fence at the edge of a wood. That I might find out before advancing the line whether a group of men ahead were our own cavalry or rebels.
A quick volley of zipping bullets settled the matter and we quickly drove them out.
In crossing a little path that left an opening through the wheat towards the rebel line a minie [ball] just missed my head. The next man to cross was killed & one who tried to get to his body had his leg broken.
One of my sergeants danced with joy when a minie struck a small tree in front of him. The tree did not half protect him but he was delighted to think his shots had drawn direct return from the rebels. He was a fighter. I moved out of his range.
Our continual skirmishing had used up our ammunition & we had to take it from the boxes of the dead & wounded when about 7 o'clock, came the order “skirmishers forward, take the fort”.
We thought it must be a mistake! A thin line of men five paces apart storm fortifications? We had never heard of such a thing before nor had the rebels it seems.
One of their officers swore roundly a little while after saying he had his artillery double loaded for our infantry attack but he had been captured by a miserable Yankee skirmish line.
Gen. Grant said it was one of the most brilliant feats of the war.
It was believed that the fortifications at Petersburg were sparsely manned. Grant believed it, Butler believed it, and Baldy Smith had been informed of it, but Smith was not going to commit until he was sure. Historian Bruce Catton wrote that Smith “had nearly all the qualities needed for success except a sense of the value of time and the ability to get along with his superior officers – to whom, an admirer confessed, he was at times 'a perfect Ishmaelite.'” After personally reconnoitering the battlefield at considerable danger to himself (which Butler would later describe as “interminable reconnaissances”) and after subjecting the poorly protected Captain Parlin and the hundreds of other skirmishers to roughly eight hours of rebel sharpshooting and artillery fire General Smith finally agreed with previous determinations that the line was lightly manned. He also decided that a full assault would endanger too many troops; that because of a paucity of rebel infantry behind the works, a skirmish line could take the forts. Tight and deep formations of infantry, he reasoned, would be decimated by heavy artillery, which the enemy did possess. At 4 pm, Smith sent word to his field commanders to prepare for the assault with beefed up skirmish lines. Unfortunately, during what appeared to him to be a lull, Chief of Artillery Follet had taken his horses to water and the assault was further delayed for an hour or more because artillery could not be moved closer to the front.
Once started, the assault moved quickly forward. Troops of the 13th New Hampshire in General Brooks' 1st Division had worked themselves so close to the Dimmock fortifications they could hear the rebel commandant order his artillery to load and fire. They were situated behind logs and abatis in the relative safety of a ravine.
In [Bearse's Book] the story of the “miserable Yankee skirmish line” is also told, although differently. His recounting has General Brooks' New Hampshire regiment taking rebel Battery 5 after two captains, Stoodley and Julian, commented on the success of the charge:
Stoodley: “If we follow this thing up right now, we can take this battery.”
Julian: “Then we can take it.”
Later they were to accept the sword and surrender of Captain Sturdivant who proclaimed angrily, “Here are my guns double-shotted for infantry and all of us captured by a _____ Yankee skirmish line.”
Captain Parlin probably heard this story later and repeated it. His regiment's right flank was on the New Hampshire 13th's left. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elias Wright, they charged and took Battery 6 along with Colonel Joseph Kiddoo's 4th and 22nd Regiments of the 2nd Division. Colonel Holman's detached companies of the First charged further down the line, although he had trouble with two companies of the 5th USCT, one of Colonel Duncan's Regiments, which refused his orders. From Holman's report:
At 6 p. m. I received the order from General Hincks to make the assault with the skirmish line. I immediately ordered Colonel Wright, First U. S. Colored Troops, to advance upon the enemy’s works; at the same time I ordered the captain commanding two companies of the Fifth U. S. Colored Troops, whose men were deployed as skirmishers on the left, to make a determined assault upon the enemy’s works in his front in connection with the First United States. Those two did not advance, for what reason I am not aware. At the same time I dismounted and took immediate command of two companies of the First United States on the left near the Jordan Point road. The ground upon the left covering the approach to the works in my front was found to be covered with timber and brush, and exceedingly difficult to cross. The right of the line under Colonel Wright, having smooth ground to advance over, reached and carried the enemy’s works known as Battery Number 6 before I had very much advanced through the brush and timber on the left. I moved forward the two companies on the left as fast as possible, and received the fire from the gun known as Battery Numbers 9 when within fifty yards, and carried the battery from the front, the enemy running to Battery Numbers 10, which was still stubbornly held, when opportunately the Fourth United States, who had entered the enemy’s works farther to the right, came down upon their flank and carried the position.
Why did the two companies of the 5th refuse Holman's order to advance? The answer may be found in this statement from Colonel Duncan's report:
At 1 p. m., in obedience to orders from General Hinks, the Fifth Regiment, which had suffered considerably, was withdrawn, two companies being left to continue the demonstration and to guard our left flank.
Were the two companies left in the field the same that refused Holman's orders? If so, it's likely the men had been under constant heavy fire all day and were not in the mood to obey orders from a Colonel from another brigade. Or they may have shared Captain Parlin's dismay at the thought of a mere skirmish line assaulting such an imposing fortification.
Colonel Joseph B. Kiddoo, commanding the 4th and the 22nd that evening was the irresistible force on this day. His account of the charge:
. . . at about 4 p.m. I received orders from the colonel commanding to send out three more companies and to form a skirmish line with one pace interval. I complied with said order by sending Major Cook, of my regiment, in command of the line. He received orders from the colonel commanding to advance his skirmishers till he felt the enemy’s line, and to advance against his works when he saw the lines of General Brooks’ command advancing. Accordingly, at a few minutes before sundown, Major Cook, seeing the line of General Brooks advancing, reports to me that he ordered his line to advance and charge the work in his immediate front, now know as Battery Number 7. He further reports that both officers, and men cheerfully obeyed this order and advanced on the run till they got so far under the guns of the battery as to be sheltered from their fire. At this juncture Major Cook ordered his line to break to the right and left, in order to gain the rear of the work. This was promptly done, and Captain Force and Lieutenant Miliken, of my regiment, were the first to enter the work in the rear. These officers, as well as Major Cook, report to me that there were two 12-pounder howitzers and one iron piece in the fort when they entered it. The skirmishers of the First were on the left of Major Cook’s line, and those of the Fourth were on the right, portions of both of which entered the fort after the men of my regiment had possessed it. When the skirmish line advanced I received orders from the colonel [Duncan] commanding to take the rest of my command to its support. I moved out on the double-quick, and finding Battery Numbers 7 in our possession I turned my attention to Battery Numbers 8 I found Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, First U. S. Colored Troops, with a portion of his skirmish line occupying a small lunette between Batteries Nos. 7 and 8, which had been abandoned by the enemy. I proposed that we unite our commands and charge Battery Numbers 8. He thought it not safe, but proposed to support me if I would do so. I immediately formed a column of companies, left a few of my men on the parapet of the lunette to engage the gunners on Battery Numbers 8, which were in easy range, and who were playing with some effect upon my men as they were forming for the charge. The charge was made across a deep and swampy ravine. The enemy immediately ceased firing his artillery and took the parapets of the fort and rifle-pit as infantrymen. My men wavered at first under the hot fire of the enemy, but soon, on seeing their colors on the opposite side of the ravine, pushed rapidly up and passed the rifle-pits and fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Wright came to my support when I had advanced part the way up the opposite side of the ravine and at a time when I was most heavily pressed. The enemy left me one 12-pounder howitzer in the fort, which was immediately turned against Battery Numbers 9. Lieutenant Short, whom I left in care of the wounded and to bury the dead, reports that he buried 11 and brought away 43 wounded. The enemy retreated to Battery Numbers 9, reformed and advanced apparently to take the work he had just lost. I formed all the men of both regiments and advanced to meet him, and drove him back. At this juncture I would have advanced against Battery Numbers 9 had it not been that company commanders assured me that the ammunition was about expended. At about 9 o’clock I was relieved by troops of the Second Corps, when I rejoined my brigade.
An impressive account. Captain Parlin must have regretted that he missed the moment when victory was secured.
Chaplain Turner offers this lyrical account of the assault:
In this precarious predicament we had to foot by foot and inch by inch toward the rebel forts, till late in the afternoon, when Colonel Holman resolved that he would keep his men under fire no longer, unless it was to accomplish some end more than had been achieved for several hours. So he rode down the line of his brigade and told the men to get ready to take the forts, which was glorious news to the boys. A few moment only intervened before the bayonets were fixed, and away went Uncle Sam's sable sons across an old field nearly three-quarters of a mile wide, in the face of rebel grape and canister and the unbroken clatter of thousands of muskets. Nothing less the pen of horror could begin to describe the terrific roar and dying yells of that awful yet masterly charge and daring feat.
The rebel balls would tear up the ground at time and create such a heavy dust in front of our charging army that they could scarcely see the forts for which they were making. But onward they went through the dust and every impediment while they and the rebels were crying out “Fort Pillow.” This seems to be the battle-cry on both sides. But onward they went, waxing stronger and mightier every time Fort Pillow was mentioned. Soon the boys were at the base of the Fort, climbing over abatis, and jumping the deep ditches, ravines, &c. . . .
Based on these reports, I would guess that Captain Parlin was probably shot in the midst of the charge against Battery 6 before he reached the base of the wall. In the speech to veterans, he describes his wounding this way:
But away we must and did go reinforced on my left by the color company.
Then the air was full of shot and shell. It seemed as though my head was in a network of zipping bullets. The noise was deafening!
The color bearer did not hear the order “by the right flank” & running toward him turning a little to the left I put up my hand to a sharp cut in my neck, wondering for an instant what it was though the bullets were like hailstones.
Then someone stumbled over me & I found myself on the ground. The ball had passed through my neck (entering here and coming out here) & had stunned me for I know not how long.
Capt. Sprague says he saw me lying there and thought that is the last of poor Parlin.
Our men took the fort & there was hand-to-hand fighting. It was even whispered among our officers that our men showed no quarter to the rebels.
Going to the rear I met the advance of Grant's Army of the Potomac, just having crossed the James River.
I had a few days at Chesapeake Hospital and leave of absence. A stiff neck is inconvenient sometimes but we got along very well as she who is now the better part of me can tell.
A good old lady still living in Natick asked my mother if the wound would cause me to lose the use of my neck.
". . . she who is the better part of me," is the Captains future wife, Mary Miranda Brown, who he met at the Chesapeake hospital. How Captain Parlin survived a gunshot wound through the neck, mostly likely from a .58 caliber minie ball, is a mystery. It was a miracle it didn’t hit his spine, trachea, epiglotus, thyroid, or larynx. The wound, however, was so serious he would be on medical leave for more than ten weeks before he re-joined his regiment.
The men the Captain met on his way to the hospital were part of General Winfield Hancock's 2nd Corps of the Army of the Potomac. They relieved the tired fighters of the 18th Corps of the Army of the James that evening.
The Captain mentions that he heard rumors from other officers that “our men showed no quarter to the rebels.” This rumor is also confirmed by Chaplin Turner account of the capture of Battery 6:
The next place we saw the rebels was going out the rear of the forts with their coattails sticking straight out behind. Some few held up their hands and pleaded for mercy, but our boys thought that over Jordan would be the best place for them, and sent them there, with very few exceptions.
Later in the same report, Chaplain Turner, apparently aware that his celebration of the killing of those in the act of surrender was inconsistent with his position as a Christian minister, backpedaled a bit:
There is one thing, though, which is highly endorsed by an immense number of both white and colored people, which I am sternly opposed to, and that is the killing of all rebel prisoners taken by our soldiers. True, the rebels have set the example, particularly in killing the colored soldiers; but it is a cruel one, and two cruel acts never make one humane act. Such a course of warfare is an outrage on civilization and nominal Christianity. . .
The assault began at 7 pm and lasted less than two hours. It was successful as far as it went. Rebel Batteries 3 through 11 inclusive had been taken. Over a mile of the vaunted Dimmock Line was now under control of Union forces. General Hinks wrote:
Colonel J. H. Holman and Colonel S. A. Duncan, commanding brigades, acquitted themselves with great gallantry and credit during the operations of the 15th, and I heartily approve their commendations of the gallant and soldierly behavior of the officers serving under them, who are mentioned in their several reports, and the reports of regimental commanders, and especially refer to the gallant bearing and soldierly behavior of Colonel J. B. Kiddoo, Twenty-second U. S. Colored Troops.
In the gallant and soldierly deportment of the troops engaged on the 15th instant under varying circumstances, the celerity with which they moved to the charge; the steadiness and coolness exhibited by them under heavy and long-continued fire; the impetuosity with which they sprang to the assault; the patient endurance of wounds, we have a sufficient proof that colored men, when properly officered, instructed, and drilled, will make most excellent infantry of the line, and may be used as such soldiers to great advantage.
Unfortunately for Union forces, General Baldy Smith ordered the advance to stop just inside the walls of the captured fortifications. The roads into Petersburg were undefended. A march to seize and occupy the city could have succeeded. Hancock's troops, having gotten lost because of a faulty map, had arrived belatedly after the capture of the works. Smith believed the troops were too exhausted to move on the city, which reportedly did not sit well with his or Hancock's troops who knew the rebels would be rebuilding their fortifications overnight and that another frontal assault would be required to take them. Surprisingly, the recently arrived Hancock--among the most brilliant, daring and successful Civil War generals--because of his unfamiliarity with the situation, deferred to Smith's decision to not press the advantage. The offensive ground to a halt with Petersburg just a few hundred yards down the road and ripe for the taking. The path to victory was not taken that night or the war might have been shortened and countless lives saved. Where to fix the blame for the failure to take Petersburg and shorten the war? The fault lies with all those in command, including Grant, Meade, Butler, Smith and Hancock. Grant because he was not close by to assure it would go according to schedule, then continue into Petersburg when the breakthrough was achieved; Meade for showing little interest and not informing Hancock what his role would be; Butler for failing to coordinate communications between the Union command from Grant on down and not informing Hancock what his role would be; Smith for failing to push the enormous advantage he had when Petersburg was vulnerable; and Hancock for not imposing his will and seizing victory when the opportunity presented itself.
In their defense: Hancock's Gettysburg wound was bothering him, his weary army had marched many miles that day after having suffered significant casualties at Cold Harbor two weeks before; Smith's malaria was troubling him and he'd drunk some bad water at Cold Harbor while the troops who fought for him there were in a condition similar to Hancock’s— exhausted. Butler was simply not capable of grabbing the reins and effectively commanding Smith and Hancock.
The battle marked the end of the Overland Campaign and the beginning of the siege of Petersburg. The Campaign was a success, but it would have been one of the more brilliant in military history if it had ended with the early fall of Petersburg leading to-- certainly within months--the fall of Richmond and the Confederate States of America. Richmond could not have resisted long with federal troops occupying Petersburg and its network of railroads.
It might also be said that the Overland Campaign itself was to blame for the failure to take Petersburg. In it, Grant intensified the pace and ferocity of the war. When Grant said to Meade, “Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also,” it meant the war would be fought on a daily basis. There would be no rest for either side.
In 1862, thirty battles were fought in the state of Virginia. In 1863, only 19 were fought there. In 1864, at the height of the war, there were 52. The most telling statistic? Of the 52 battles fought in Virginia in 1864, 31 were fought between May 5th and June 15th, a forty-one day period. That was the Overland Campaign: rapid, bloody, unrelenting warfare fought day after day. The generals and troops who were there at the assault on Petersburg on June 15th were totally exhausted.
On June 15th, the US Colored Troops of the 3rd Division were fresh and eager. They had one disadvantage: inexperience in a direct assault. Despite their green status, they performed admirably. If they had been given the order to charge at 2 Pm rather than 7 PM , they likely would have taken the city by evening. If the assault had gone forward at 2 pm, they might have enjoyed the bounty of the Cockade City before sunset. Hundreds of lives might have been saved and much suffering averted by a greatly shortened war.
Several of the men cited in this chapter escaped being casualties on this day, June 15th, 1864. In future engagements, they would not be so lucky.
Due to his wound, Captain Parln was absent on medical leave for almost 11 weeks-- which testifies to the seriousness of his neck wound. He was transported to Natick to recover at home.
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