Captain Parlin in the Civil War, Chapter 7

                                                 Chapter VII.                                                                                                                                                                              
                       Second Battle of Fair Oaks and Darbytown Rd.


                                . . . and there I made a vow
                                That when these wars are over, and I am home at last, 
                                However much I travel, I shall not travel fast.  
                                                                                Norman Davey

    A week after the battles all along the earthworks that led to Chaffin's Farm on the bluff above the James River, Union forces attempted to consolidate their new gains.  Earthworks and abbatis designed to withstand assaults from the south and east were turned to face north and west.  This was achieved under nearly constant shelling, sniper fire and with the stench of the dead emanating from the battlefield where Union and rebel forces had engaged on September 29th and 30th. A truce was then declared and men from both sides descended on the battlefield to collect the bodies of the dead.  With the truce over, sharpshooters on both sides went back to picking off vulnerable enemies.    
    On October 7th, Confederate forces again attempted to dislodge Union troops from the fortifications they had taken along the line.  This time they tried to turn the Union right and march down the line to retake Fort Burnham/Harrison.  The attack commanded by Lee and directed at the overextended Union right, where General Kautz and his calvary were weakly posted, initially met with success.  Kautz had complained about his vulnerability and demanded shovels, picks and wheel barrows to help his men to dig in.   Butler told him all the tools were being used to fortify works along the line which started near Signal Hill at the James and ran more than four miles up and beyond the Darbytown Road, where the apprehensive Kautz and his men were stationed.  Because the enemy was closest and the danger greater near Fort Burnham/Harrison, Butler had his men hastily  improving the works at that section.  Kautz complained that should a large force stage an attack upon his men would be in danger.  While he had an escape route, it was only a muddy path that was potentially a bottleneck.  According to Kautz, Butler replied that his "calvary had legs and could run away."                                     When the attack by Lee's generals Hoke and Field came, it quickly routed Kautz's men who fled in wild disorder.  As Kautz feared, the escape route which crossed a small swampy area became blocked when artillery bogged down.  The Confederates shot the horses to prevent them dislodging the guns and Kautz and his men retreated chaotically, which was witnessed by General Birney's 10th Army Corps troops, who were establishing their lines in anticipation of further attacks below New Market Road.                                                                                      Lee's goal was to re-take Fort Burnham (nee Harrison) and the morning's rout of Kautz's calvary and artillery portended well.  But Birney's men were busy shoring up defenses to face north and bracing for the continuation of the attack that routed Kautz’s calvary. Captain Parlin and the 18th, now under the command of General Weitzel, were doing the same in the vicinity of Fort Burnham in the event Lee's troops breached Birney's line.  
     When it came, Field's attack on Birney’s lines was fierce but repelled in large measure by soldiers equipped with the new seven-shot Spencer repeating rifles, which fired bullets so quickly that supply lines were barely able to keep the riflemen supplied with ammunition.  Their effect was deadly.  Field expected to be joined by Hoke's division but waited in vain.  He said long after the war that had Hoke joined the attack he would have had a significant victory would have been achieved and Fort Harrison/Burnham might then have been re-taken.  He did not know why Hoke's division to his west refrained from attacking.  It may be that Lee, fearing a Union counter-attack from another direction, ordered it to stay put.  The battle ended with approximately 500 Confederate casualties and lost the opportunity to re-take Fort Harrison.  Lee's troops returned to positions they had occupied the day before.    
        The war at this point became largely defensive.  Engineers on both sides had more than three years experience building and perfecting formidable defenses of timber and earth.  They had mastered their craft.  In the week after the October 7th attack on the Union right was repelled,  a Confederate engineer, named Porter Alexander, convinced Lee to completely re-make his line extending in parallel with the Union right because that long section extended northward closest to Richmond itself and would likely be the focus of attacks in the future.  Lee agreed.  The re-engineering by Alexander would have deadly effect on the Union offensive movements in the next few weeks, particularly for Captain Parlin and his regiment.  
     By second week in October, Butler had transferred command of  the Xth Army Corps to General Terry after General David Birney, suffering from malaria, returned to Philadelphia where he died.  On the 13th, Butler ordered Terry to "make a reconaisance in force and drive away, if practicable, the enemy from the works they are now building on the Darbytown (or Central) road."     Terry took two of his three divisions and based on faulty and untimely intelligence from Kautz launched an assault at the Confederate line near Darbytown Road, which had appeared weak, but had been re-inforced at the last minute in anticipation of a federal assault.  The rebels had bent their line at a right angle and what appeared to be an opening was a trap.  When federal troops charged through the opening the were blasted by withering enfilade fire.  The troops in blue suffered over 200 casualties although only 15 died.  Fast-arriving re-inforcements and quick adjustments made by Lee and Field had sealed their fate.  Unfortunately for Terry, instructions from Butler to retire from the field  arrived after he ordered the attack to begin.
       The war had changed dramatically in the previous two months with the victories at Mobile Bay and Atlanta on September 2nd.  Shortly thereafter Sherman began his vaunted march to the sea, destroying all in his path.  In September, Sheridan won several engagements against Early in the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia’s bread basket.   Early, who burned Chambersburg, Maryland and threatened Washington, D.C. in late July, was chased down into Virginia by Sheridan, who won victories at Orequon, Fisher's Hill and and Tom's Brook.  For three weeks in late September and early October, he, per Grant's orders, waged a slash and burn campaign against occupants of the fertile valley.  On October 19th, however, the Confederates successfully staged a surprise attack against Sheridan's forces at Cedar Creek while Sheridan was returning from consultations in Washington.  In one of the more dramatic moments of the war, Sheridan after seeing a disaster unfolding, raced at a gallop from the town of Winchester, re-grouped his Army of the Shenandoah, revived their fighting spirit and led them in a successful counterattack that decimated Early’s army.  The historian Henry Cabot Lodge in a book Hero Tales of American History which he published with Theodore Roosevelt in 1895 described how Sheridan regained the offensive this way: 

    In Sheridan’s absence, General Jubal A. Early soon after dawn, had made an unexpected attack on our army at Cedar Creek. Surprised by the assault, the national troops had given way in all directions, and a panic had set in. Getty’s division with Lowell’s cavalry held on at Middletown, but, with this exception, the rout was complete. When Sheridan rode out of Winchester, he met an already beaten army. His first thought was the natural one to make a stand at Winchester and rally his troops about him there. His second thought was the inspiration of the great commander. He believed his men would rally as soon as they saw him. He believed that enthusiasm was one of the great weapons of war and that this was the moment of all others when it might be used with decisive advantage. With this thought in his mind, he abandoned the idea of forming his men at Winchester, and rode bareheaded through the fugitives, swinging his hat, straight for the front, and calling on his men as he passed to follow him. As the soldiers saw him, they turned and rushed after him. He had not calculated in vain upon the power of personal enthusiasm, but, at the same time, he did not rely upon any wild rush to save the day. The moment he reached the field of battle, he set to work with the coolness of a great soldier to make all the dispositions, first, to repel the enemy, and then to deliver an attack which could not be resisted. One division after another was rapidly brought into line and placed in position, the thin ranks filling fast with the soldiers who had recovered from their panic, and followed Sheridan and the black horse all the way down from Winchester. He had been already two hours on the field when, at noon, he rode along the line, again formed for battle. Most of the officers and men then thought he had just come, while in reality, it was his own rapid work which had put them in the line along which he was riding.  Once on the field of battle, the rush and hurry of the desperate ride from Winchester came to an end. First, the line was reformed, then the enemy’s assault was repulsed, and it was made impossible for them to again take the offensive. 
    But, Sheridan, undazzled by his brilliant success up to this point, did not mar his work by over haste. Two hours more passed before he was ready, and then, when all was prepared, with his ranks established and his army ranged in position, he moved his whole line forward, and won one of the most brilliant battles of the war, having, by his personal power over his troops, and his genius in action, snatched a victory from a day which began in surprise, disaster, and defeat.

    Back at Petersburg, Grant was so pleased to learn of victory he ordered a 100-gun salute.  The demoralizing effect Sheridan's victory had on the South cannot be exaggerated.  
       With victories around the country accruing and Lincoln's election more assured, Grant was formulating a new offensive in mid-October.  It would be the sixth of nine offensives that began with the assault on Petersburg on June 15th, when Captain Parlin was wounded.  The fifth had been the battle at Chafin's Farm and New Market Heights in late September.  The sixth would, like the fifth, involve a double thrust to stretch Lee's forces and try to  break through to Richmond while cutting off rail traffic to Petersburg.   The thrust north of the James would begin at Darbytown and perhaps other roads north of it that led to Richmond including Charlestown Road, Williamsburg Road and Nine Mile Road.   The Xth and the XVIIIth (now under General Weitzel)  Army Corps would search and probe and perhaps drive toward Richmond at points to be determined  along these roads, while Meade and  the IInd, Vth, and IXth corps would assault Confederate fortifications protecting the South Side Railroad southwest of Petersburg in an attempt to cut the last rail line from the the southern states into Petersburg.  Captain Parlin's last battle was approaching:   

       On the 26th of Oct 1864 the 10th and 18th army corps were drawn from our entrenchments north of the James River and massed for one of Gen. Grant's demonstrations all along the lines.
    It was a day of terrible fighting.  Charge after charge was made.  Several brigades managed to get within a few rods of the rebel works and dared not either go forward or back but lay there waiting for darkness to let them out.  Some were captured by charges from the rebels.  The 10th A.C. was nearly all killed or captured.  They destroyed their flag to save it from the rebels.  
    The two corps lost 1100 men.  My own company lost 17 out of about 50 in a few moments.  
Our point of attack was beyond Fair Oaks, the scene of Gen. Casey's battle under McClellan & less than 4 miles from Richmond.   In fact we went a mile nearer to Richmond than any infantry had previously done.

Captain Parlin refers to the maneuver as a "demonstration" but in the hands of Butler it became something else.  Grant had ordered Butler to advance and stage a demonstration on the north side of the James against the fortifications east of Richmond in order to draw Lee's attention there.  On the south side of the James below Petersburg, Meade’s Army of the Potomac would then move aggressively and take the South Side Railroad, the only remaining tracks connecting Petersburg with the South.   Although ordered by Grant to avoid direct assaults, Butler instructed General Terry's Xth Army Corps and General Weitzel’s  XVIIIth, to attack weakly defended positions if they could find them.  The results were disastrous as the captain notes.  But I think the Captain confuses the battle on October 13th in which the Xth suffered considerable losses with the battle of the 27th, in which the Xth was not involved in any direct assault, but was used to keep the Confederates massed at Darbytown Road while Weitzel's 18th moved north to look for weakness around the Williamsburg, Charles City and Nine Mile Roads.  Nearly all the heavy fighting on October 27th involved Weitzel's 18th A.C. which included Captain Parlin's 1st USCT.   
    General Longstreet, considered by many to be the best corp commander on either side in the war and who had recently returned after partially recovering from a friendly-fire wound suffered in the Battle of the Wilderness in May, was quick to notice that the feint Butler ordered at Darbytown Road did not resemble a determined assault.  He sensed the direction the Yanks were going and responded quickly by ordering General Field to re-inforce weak points along the line to the north.  Longstreet's intuition that there were Union troops moving quickly north to test the lines above Darbytown proved correct.  When the attacks began, whole rebel battalions had been quickly moved up the line to meet the threat, often with men riding two to a horse.  
    While feigning the attack with Terry's Xth on the rebel works at Darbytown Road, Butler sent Wietzel 18th A.C.  north to probe what were believed to be lightly defended positions at the  Williamsburg and Nine Mile Roads.  Initial reconnaissance indicated a weak spot at the Williamsburg Road.  Two battalions were assigned to attack the position.  Weitzel reasoned that if they were lightly defended, they could be easily carried and if not, he would only be risking two battalions.  Longstreet's advice to Field to get his troops in position there quickly turned what looked promising for federal troops into a slaughter.  The two battalions met stiff resistance and in the end, after suffering numerous casualties, found themselves trapped and unable to retreat.  In their severely lacerated condition, they were easy prey for the Confederates to swoop in and take prisoner those who had survived.  Nearly fifty were killed, perhaps two hundred were wounded and as many as 500 were captured in what turned into a rout.  
While this was occurring, Weitzel ordered Colonel Hohlman's brigade which included the Captain Parlin's 1st, Colonel Kiddoo's  22nd and Lt Colonel Chamberalain's 37th---all regiments of US Colored Troops--- to march up the Nine Mile Road and see if they could find another weak spot in the line.  At  a spot called the Old Tavern, probably a ruin, Hohlman ran into what appeared to be substantial number of Confederate calvary.  Anticipating an attack, he formed the 37th into a box formation on the northeast side of the road.  The attack did not come.  Instead, as the 1st and 22nd continued to advance they came under sustained artillery fire from the fortifications ahead.  Hohlman responded aggressively and attacked with full force of both the 1st and 22nd regiments.  While the 1st performed admirably, the 22nd under Colonel Kiddoo did not:
     

    Our charge was made first through tall woods & then out on the open plain, say as far as from here to Col. Waitt's home all exposed to the raking fire of a battery of several guns and the musketry of we knew not how many rebel infantry.  Our Lieut. Coe had us mixed up so that we went in left in front bringing me at the extreme left connecting with Col. Kiddoo’s regiment.
    We had reached about 2/3 of the distance & striking the rebel works obliquely the left of our regiment actually got into the battery when Col. Kiddoo’s regiment broke and ran to the rear like a flock of sheep.
    This left my company high in air & the mark for the whole rebel line.
    It was too much for us.  We were brought to a stand still just as a hard blow on my left thigh told me that I was wounded again.

Colonel Kiddoo was later investigated for his actions that day.  He was charged with drunkeness and dereliction of duty by several officers who filed complaints against him.  He was also seriously wounded as the narrative below describes.  Eventually he was exonerated, achieved the rank of brevet Major General and was buried at West Point with full honors upon his death in August of 1880. The New York Times printed a lengthy obituary describing his career.                                     The narrative resumes:                                                                                             
    I told my men & two of them took me between them and luckily we reached the woods without another wound.
    Our ordnance officer gave me his horse until the hospital steward was found who bandaged the wound.
    The tender solicitude and care of my men I can never forget.  Some of them had received hard punishment from me, yet they hung about preparing to carry me off if an ambulance could not be found.
    Capt. [William] Cutler came along, looked me over and predicted a leave of absence.  He had part of his boot heel carried away by a piece of shell in that fight though he was not in the charge.
    His regiment had formed a hollow square expecting to receive the charge of a large rebel cavalry force that threatened us.
    This charge did not come & I think one of our own captains stopped it.
    He, Capt. [Henry] Ward, was one of the officers who got into the rebel battery on the charge & finding he could not hold it managed to get two of the guns outside & was taking them back to our lines when the rebels captured him, guns & all.  He was the wit of the regiment.  Well educated – a college graduate.  He has since been editor of the Denver Tribune and afterwards Indian Agent.
    He tells the story now that a rebel officer rode up and declared he should blow his brains out.  Ward says he told them that as far “as he was concerned he rather he would avoid it.”
    Then the officer demanded how many cavalry we had & where they were.
    Ward knew we had only a small troop, but he knew where a large force ought to be & told the rebel that he had a brigade of cavalry behind the woods on our right.  We think now he saved us from capture.  For had that rebel cavalry come on us, so used & mixed up after the charge as we were, we must have been taken prisoners.
    The ambulance came for me just at dusk & in it one of the purist & bravest of Christian captains                                                                                                ([William W. McB.] Houston) with a terrible shell wound in his shoulder begging me to protect him from a delirious Colonel (Kiddoo) who, paralyzed in his lower limbs by a shot in his left side, kept striking him as he threw his arms about.  
    I had to crawl between these two officers and lie there from dusk until daylight.  We laid through that terrible night in the stormy blackness of White Oak Swamp, over roughest roads with mud to the hubs. A drunken ambulance driver --  no water – no surgeon -- powerless to help my comrades.  Overcoat, blouse, vest and undershirt soaked with the blood of my dear captain who died when they took us out in the morning.
    We reached Deep Bottom at daylight and were taken at once on board a steamer.
    The captain gave three of us (Cols. Kiddoo, Holman & me) his own cabin.  There the surgeon cut out the ball from my leg, and Col. Kiddoo’s from his side.  Col. Holman’s could not be reached.
    Then followed nearly two months of fever and gangrene at Chesapeake Hospital.
    They burned out my wound eight times with muriatic acid to kill the gangrene.
    It measured 5 inches across it at one time.
    Then came leave of absence – return home,  resignation, Discharge “from wounds received in action”, and after nearly three years, my army life was ended.

During his recovery from gangrene, Captain Parlin had a religious awakening while suffering through the muriatic acid treatments.   He described the event in his speech to Christian Youth at a retreat:   

    Here however occurred what perhaps has been to me a most important event in my life. With the then known methods of treating gangrene the chances of recovery were not in my favor and the suffering was intense.   Everyone about was kind- and sympathetic. But they were strangers and a hospital is a lonely place when you have none of those near + dear to cheer + comfort you.    We kept up as good courage as possible making as light as we could of our troubles.  I overheard some men who had first had their legs amputated trying to get up bets as to who could jump the farthest.                                                                 The incident of which I wish to tell you of occurred …. of the first operation on me and when the burning of the acid was like holding a coal of fire on the flesh.  I turned to my Testament opened it a bit when such a flood of light and joy was poured into my soul that at the instant all the pain was forgotten and I was filled full of love and gratitude for My Master.                                                                  “Thank Thee” came instantly to my lips.  A new world was open to me.  I was permitted for an instant to look within the one that surrounds us and see + know that I was in the hands of a kind Protector who was doing everything well, to know that I was just where I ought to be.  That in no other place on earth do I belong then.  It took away all gloom and sadness- it lifted me through all the pain that followed and saved my life.                                                                             The memory of that moment has never left me and tonight I gladly testify that our Savior who revealed himself so Precious then to me is precious still.  I know he will give all needed wisdom, I know he will give all needed comfort and strength if we trust and follow him.  He will never leave nor forsake us.  I might doubt sometimes but I am always set aright by the memory of that revelation that certainly came from above.  
 
    Captain Parlin would need the comfort of his faith because tragedy and death followed him from the battlefields of Virginia to the peaceful streets of Natick.  Parlin married his wife Mary Miranda Brown on February 9th, 1865.  On November 12th, 1866, she bore him a son named Alfred Herman Parlin, whose middle name honored the Captain's brother who had been killed at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse in May of 1864.  On April 13th, 1870,  Mary gave birth to another son, Arthur Brown Parlin.  Tragically, both boys died of diphtheria within a week of each other in February, 1873, one age six, the other three.  In the 19th century, the disease was known as "the strangling angel of children."                                         After the deaths of their sons, the Parlins had two more children, both daughters:  Mary Winifred Parlin, my great-grandmother, born May 11th, 1874, and Marion Louise, born September 21st, 1879.  The younger daughter became a school teacher and one of the Captain’s speeches was delivered to her students.  Mary Winifred died in the house at 201 Valley Road, Watching N.J.  in November, 1948, seven months after I was born.  Growing up, I was given the first floor bedroom in which she spent her declining years.  I remember that holes had been drilled in the floor for a system of ropes and bells that allowed her to signal to servants in the kitchen at the other end of the house to come tend to her needs.      Captain Parlin returned to Natick after the war and purchased his father's paint  store business, which he turned into a thriving full-scale hardware business. His daughter married Charles Aubrey Eaton, D.D. in 1895.  In 1902 he sold his hardware business and went to live with the Eaton family in Cleveland.  In 1909 the Eaton family with six children and the Parlins in tow moved to Watchung N. J. 

 

                                                        Finis